China, Europe, and the Pandemic Recession: Beijing’s Investments and Transatlantic Security (with Chris Alden, Erik Brattberg, Roger Cliff, Mark Duckenfield, Evan Ellis, Nicholas Nelson, and Lauren Speranza)
U.S. Army War College Press, May 4, 2022
This multi-author monograph examines the risks posed by Chinese investment in Europe. Beijing's predatory economic statecraft builds China's soft power, weakens allied geopolitical solidarity, & places both militarily relevant infrastructure and dual-use technology at risk. Is Europe prepared & able to parry Beijing’s efforts? In support of EUCOM & DHS, this study offers actionable policy recommendations for decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic.
U.S. Army War College Press, October 9, 2020
This monograph examines the 2014–18 iteration of the NDPP, which represented a stunning turnaround in transatlantic burden sharing. The analysis reveals a combination of factors—the changed threat environment, political pressure from Washington, and the role of “policy entrepreneurs” working within NATO—best explain the alliance’s success in achieving more equitable burden sharing. In addition to drawing key lessons from the 2014-18 NDPP, policy-makers will find this monograph particularly useful for its forward-leaning policy recommendations to strengthen and build upon NATO’s burden-sharing successes to date.
U.S. Army War College Press, August 25, 2017
The Department of Defense can achieve deterrence and assurance objectives more effectively and efficiently through a rebalancing of its force posture. The Army should reverse the trend of the last 2 decades and forward station additional heavy units in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula, while ending lengthy, heel-to-toe rotational noncombat deployments.
U.S. Army War College Press, January 1, 2016
Military engagement and forward-based U.S. military forces offer decisionmakers effective and efficient mechanisms for maintaining American influence, deterring aggression, assuring allies, building tomorrow’s coalitions, managing the challenge of disorder in the security environment, mitigating the risk of a major interstate war, and facilitating U.S. and coalition operations should deterrence fail. Unfortunately, significant cuts to overseas permanent presence and continuing pockets of institutional bias against engagement as a force multiplier and readiness enhancer have combined to limit the leverage possible through these two policy tools.
U.S. Army War College Press, October 1, 2015
American security policy rests on a three-legged stool consisting of defense, diplomacy, and development. As President Obama implied in his May 2014 speech at West Point, the United States is in the midst of a resurgence of diplomacy and development, as it seeks to leverage diplomatic influence, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions to solve the most vexing international security challenges. However, the dramatic rebalance toward diplomacy and development over the last several years has largely has failed.
U.S. Army War College Press, May 28, 2015
Russian aggression in 2014 caught U.S. policy and strategy off guard, forcing reactive measures and reevaluation of the U.S. approach toward Russia. Moscow employed nonlinear methodologies and operated just beneath traditional thresholds of conflict to take full advantage of U.S. and NATO policy and process limitations. In light of this strategic problem, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), conducted a wargame that revealed four key considerations for future policy and strategy.
U.S. Army War College Press, June 1, 2014
The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army’s forward presence in East Asia, given the evolving strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. Without unduly harming America's commitment to deterrence on the Korean peninsula, a reconfigured Army forward presence could help to achieve U.S. objectives throughout the theater more effectively through more regular, longer-duration engagement with critical allies and partners, while reducing the recurring transportation costs associated with today’s practice of sending U.S.-based units to conduct most exercises and training events across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Certainly, there are some major challenges involved in reconfiguring the Army's forward presence, but these are not insurmountable. Furthermore, to avoid trying would severely limit the effectiveness and the efficiency of the Army’s contribution to broader U.S. national security goals.
U.S. Army War College Press, October 1, 2013
In 2010, NATO decided to expand its ballistic missile defense program, in part because of the American offer to include its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as the centerpiece of an expanded effort. For the Allies' part, few have actually contributed tangible ballistic missile defense assets, in terms of missile interceptors, radars or other sensors, or ballistic missile defense-related platforms. This is likely to have significant implications for the U.S. Army, which has an important but largely underappreciated role in NATO missile defense today. In particular, the Army is likely to face increased manpower demands, materiel requirements, and training needs in order to meet the demand signal created by the NATO ballistic missile defense program. Additionally, Army units involved directly in or in support of ballistic missile defense are likely to face a higher OPTEMPO than currently projected. Ultimately, this will exacerbate the perceived imbalance in transatlantic burden-sharing, particularly if the EPAA provides little, if any, benefit to the defense of U.S. territory, given Washington’s decision to cancel Phase 4 of that framework.
U.S. Army War College Press, October 1, 2012
In this monograph, Dr. John R. Deni explores the utility of forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions—and, in particular, the arguments against forward presence—in the context of a decades-long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others to mistakenly tie the forward-basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, Dr. Deni bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward-basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability. Moreover, Dr. Deni’s monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American Landpower, particular in this age of austerity.